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Abstract 
Part of the debate about the ‘productivity puzzle’ concerns potential mismeasurement of GDP due to 
digital activities. This paper discusses some measurement issues arising from digitally-enabled 
substitutions in activity across the conventional production boundary. Production boundary issues are 
not new, as conventionally defined GDP statistics account for the monetary cost but not the time cost of 
consumption and production. This means changes in the way time is allocated between market and 
home production affect measured growth and productivity. Just as technological innovation in 
domestic appliances led to a substitution from home production into market consumption in the second 
half of the 20th century, today’s digital innovations are driving some reverse substitution out of the 
market into home production. Statistical agencies do not currently collect the data needed to measure 
the scale of the switch, but the available evidence suggests it may be enough to make a contribution to 
understanding the puzzling behaviour of measured productivity. 
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Digital activities and business models are affecting the measurement of GDP, on existing national 
accounts definitions, in multiple ways. Digital change is causing a wide range of substitutions both 
within and across the production boundary as currently defined. Substitutions between economic 
activities occur constantly but the pace has likely increased thanks to the rapid spread of fixed and 
mobile broadband. Some of these digitally-enabled changes have potentially decreased conventionally 
measured real GDP and productivity (compared to a counterfactual world of no digital innovation) by 
reducing the time cost of home production and consumption of some goods and services. Substitution 
to unmeasured sectors experiencing faster productivity growth from measured sectors whose recorded 
productivity growth will consequently be lower explains the wedge between the actual and 
counterfactual productivity measures, similar to the phenomenon Griliches (1994) discusses in the 
context of ‘unmeasurable’ sectors (government and construction for examples). Productivity growth in 
these sectors is missed because it crosses the artefact of the production boundary, leaving slower 
productivity growth activities behind in what is measured. 
 
Robert Gordon (2016) has challenged the idea that the new technologies are contributing much at all to 
either welfare or productivity. On the other hand, the digital sector insists the scale of recent innovation 
is such that the contribution of digital to the economy must be under-stated.2 It is surely the case that an 
explanation of recent productivity behaviour will involve many contributory factors, including 
overhang from the financial crisis and long-term structural issues such as demographic change. But it 
would nevertheless be surprising if the significant behavioural changes by businesses and households, 
arising from the spread in the UK and other OECD countries of broadband internet (from 2000) and 
very rapid take-up of smartphones and mobile internet (from 2007), with evident effects on production 
and consumption behaviours, had not had any significant impact on the economy.  
 
Digital change poses numerous challenges for the collection and interpretation of economic statistics, 
ranging from ensuring newer businesses and activities are included in data collection to difficulties in 
taking due account of quality change in goods and services. The range of these challenges was set out 
in the UK’s Independent Review of Economic Statistics, and addressing them is at the centre of the 
strategic plan of the Office for National Statistics (Bean 2016, ONS 2016d, Coyle 2015). Previous 
research has considered some potential contributions from technological change to the ‘productivity 
puzzle’ observed in most OECD economies since around 2008, and found them to be relatively small 
(for example, Ahmad & Schreyer 2016, Byrne et al 2016, Syverson 2016). For instance Byrne et al 
(2016) concluded the effects of quality change in ICT products and services are too small for careful 
hedonic adjustment to account for the break in trend productivity (in particular as the size of the ICT 
goods and services sector is small). 
 
Yet these conclusions on the face of it seem at odds with the dramatic extension in the diffusion and 
use of new technologies by households and businesses. To explore the question of whether 
measurement artefacts might contribute to understanding the slowdown in measured real GDP and 
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productivity growth, the focus here is on the switching of economic activity across the production 
boundary as currently defined in the System of National Accounts (SNA). Online activities undertaken 
by the household sector and substituting for marketed activities have been growing. The phenomenon 
may make a contribution to explaining the ‘productivity puzzle’ to the extent that, compared to the 
counterfactual of a non-digital world, consumers are switching from purchasing some marketed outputs 
to home production. These home produced digital activities should therefore at a minimum be 
measured more fully in the household ‘satellite’ account; given their rapid expansion, they require 
more careful measurement to inform assessments of economic welfare and policy.  
 
The fact that clearly productive online activities are occurring on the non-market side of the boundary 
also raises the question of the interpretation of measured real GDP in the existing national accounts 
framework. This goes back to the original fundamental debate about the purpose of GDP: is it simply 
an aggregate monetary measure of marketed activity? In this case the issues raised here are irrelevant. 
Or is it intended to be a measure of economic welfare (as it is in fact always used), in which case the 
national accounts should take more careful account of the various digital substitutions? The first 
approach has broadly prevailed since the 1940s (Coyle, 2014; Mitra-Kahn, 2011). Consumer surplus 
gains have by definition never been captured in (nominal) GDP because it simply measures 
transactions at market prices. Many national accountants continue to insist this is the correct approach, 
and that it is a conceptual mistake to try to account for welfare changes in GDP. For example, Ahmad 
and Schreyer (2016) point out that production boundary issues are not new conceptually, and neither is 
the creation of unmeasured consumer surplus by innovations. Bos (2017) writes, “The successive 
guidelines all agreed that national accounts should not aim at measuring welfare, but focus on serving 
as a practical tool for macro-economic policy issues,” while noting that there have been repeated calls 
over the decades for an economic welfare measure. 
 
Yet almost all policy debate uses GDP as an indicator of economic welfare. Indeed, as soon as the 
nominal figures are adjusted for price changes there is an implicit welfare judgment – why, otherwise, 
should there be any attempt to hedonically adjust prices, as the very idea of ‘quality change’ goes 
directly to underlying preferences?  Recent research (Brynjolfsson et al, 2017) aiming to measure 
directly this consumer surplus from digital innovation suggests it is large. Taken together, the scope of 
the substitutions discussed here, and of substitutions, new products and quality change occurring within 
the production boundary, is likely to be significant. Some of the individual substitutions would tend to 
reduce rather than increase the measures of labour or multifactor productivity on current definitions, so 
it is not apparent without much statistical work that they will entirely resolve the productivity ‘puzzle’. 
At a minimum many of them have implications for the construction of deflators (see for example 
Abdirahman et al 2017, Reinsdorf and Schreyer 2017). These mean nominal GDP may be over-
deflated, and real GDP growth and productivity therefore under-stated.3 To the extent that the bias in 
deflators has increased over time, this could contribute to unpicking the productivity puzzle. 
                                            
3 Throughout I use ‘real’ and ‘nominal’ as shorthand in place of the terminology of the SNA, ‘in volume terms’ 
and ‘in current price terms’ respectively. 
 4 
 
Here I focus not on prices but on a different aspect of assessing economic welfare, drawing on the 
insights of Gary Becker (1965) concerning the allocation of time between market and home production. 
As Becker notes, the time needed for the consumption of services in particular never enters 
conventional productivity calculations yet technological advances speed up some consumption 
activities and alter the market goods provided by service industries. He gives the example of barber 
shops: when home safety and electric razors became available, people saved time (walking to the 
barbershop and back, queuing, speed of shave) by buying razors and shaving themselves at home. 
Barbers switched the services they provided to haircuts. The recorded productivity of barbershops did 
not increase; but there was significant productivity gain in the production of shaves. He surmises that 
this effect may go some way to explain the slow growth in the measured productivity of many service 
sectors compared with goods-producing sectors. The digital technology is similarly making it less 
costly (in terms of total time plus money cost) to produce some services in the home rather than 
purchasing them in the market.  
 
This debate is central to the practical question of what statistical offices should be doing in response to 
the digital changes that form some of the most visible features of current developments in the OECD 
economies, and yet are scarcely measured as yet in official economic statistics. It also speaks both to 
the policy interpretation of productivity statistics, and also to the increasingly often-expressed 
dissatisfaction with GDP growth as a yardstick for economic policy. 
 
 
Production boundary paradoxes in the national accounts framework 
 
A key decision in defining GDP in the present System of National Accounts was where to draw the line 
in terms of what is included and excluded. Broadly speaking, this production boundary distinguishes 
paid-for activities in the market economy from unpaid activities, which are considered outside the 
productive sector. However, there are activities that by convention cross the boundary. The obvious 
one is that government activity is included in GDP although by definition it is not in the market, a 
decision intensely debated both in principle in the early days and in terms of detailed practice in the 
implementation of successive SNA revisions.4 In the present national accounts framework, broadly 
speaking firms and the government are considered producers for the purposes of inclusion in GDP, and 
households are not (although non-marketed productive activity takes place within households and 
unincorporated enterprises are included in the household sector). 
The production boundary is defined in the following way. Included are: 
a. Goods and services produced for supply to ‘units’ other than their producers; 
b. Own-account production of goods retained by their producers for final consumption or capital 
formation; 
                                            
4 Mitra-Kahn (2011) surveys the debate; on this point see also Lacey (2011); Studenski (1958) Chapter 14; Vanoli  
(2005) p249ff. 
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c. Own-account production of knowledge-capturing products retained by their producers for 
final consumption or capital formation (but excluding such products produced by households 
for their own use eg family photos); 
d. Own account production of housing services by owner occupiers; 
e. Production of domestic and personal services by paid domestic staff. 
 
Own-account production of services is excluded on the grounds that these have ‘limited repercussions 
on the rest of the economy,’ changes in their level do not affect the economy’s tax yield, and there are 
no market prices at which to value these services (SNA 2008, paras 6.27-6.30). As noted below, this 
reasoning seems at odds with the growth of market production and consumption of many household 
services from the 1950s, leading to significant (and in some countries continuing) shifting of activity 
across the production boundary since the 1970s.  
 
Conceptually, the household can be considered a production unit combining inputs of its own time 
(labour), household capital assets (ovens, cars, washing machines), and purchased intermediate or final 
goods and services, to produce or secure a range of final goods and services which in the majority of 
instances the household itself consumes, but which can also enter the productive economy (Becker 
1965, Abraham and Mackie 2005). There is a range of possible choices, for example from growing 
vegetables and cooking everything from scratch at home, to buying food and hiring a cook or eating all 
meals in restaurants. Over time, as real wages for work outside the home have increased, innovations in 
domestic technology have substituted for labour in the home, and social change has led more women to 
work in paid employment, the opportunity cost of home production has increased, and substitution 
from home production to market production has occurred (Parente, Rogerson and Wright, 2000). 
Investment in domestic capital also increased household labour productivity.  
 
As described above, the production of goods by households for their own consumption is by 
convention included in the definition of GDP, whether they are actually sold in the market or not. This 
reflects the importance of own-production of food and clothing, for instance, in low-income economies. 
“When the amount of a good produced within households is believed to be quantitatively important in 
relation to the total supply of that good within the country, its production should be recorded,” (SNA 
2008 §6.233). Goods such as these were considered ‘near market’ as a third party would be able to 
provide them to the household; and there would be market prices enabling them to be valued. However, 
the production of services (childcare, cooking, cleaning and so on) for own-consumption is excluded 
(although services provided by paid domestic staff are counted in GDP). The distinction, or ‘nearness’ 
to market of own-produced goods as opposed to services was much debated in the early days of the 
establishment of national accounting standards. In his classic history, Paul Studenski (1958) wrote: 
“Most scholars favour, in principle, the inclusion of the unpaid services of the housewife in national 
income. The difficulty, however, consists in finding a fair measure of the economic value of the 
housewife’s services,” although he added the caution that care should be taken not to try to annex too 
many own-account activities to national income (Studenski, p177, italics in original). Such services are 
productive, in that they are provided for other people, but not counted within the SNA production 
boundary.  
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Finally, the ‘own-account production of housing services by owner-occupiers’ is included in GDP, in 
the form of an imputed value for the market rent owner occupiers would otherwise have to pay for 
housing.5 Studenski noted that an imputation for owner occupied housing services had not previously 
been widely included in definitions of national income. From 1944, however, it was incorporated into 
the international standard: “Home ownership was assumed to be a business, producing services that are 
sold to the home owner in his capacity as tenant,” (Studenski p178). While almost certainly 
pragmatically motivated by the fact that the UK (a key player in the postwar national accounting 
debates) levied tax on the imputed rental of owner-occupied housing until 1963/4 (the ‘Schedule A’ 
income tax), this change was justified with reference to the obvious ease of switching between owning 
and renting, and the potentially large impact on measured GDP of decisions to switch mode of 
occupation. There is no difference in principle from the decision to go to a launderette rather than use 
the washing machine at home, but the boundary between owning and renting a house can be easily 
identified (and moreover there is a difference of scale, which is not relevant in theory but does matter 
for practical statistical purposes). This component of GDP consists of a non-monetised service derived 
from household capital; this is the only household capital asset currently accounted for.  
 
As Vanoli (2005, p242) summarises it, with the prominent exception of imputed rental of owner 
occupied dwellings: “GDP is defined in the SNA in such a way as to represent the aggregated value of 
the production of goods and services within the field of socially organized employment.” The 
definitions have evolved over time – for example in the inclusion in principle since the 1993 SNA (and 
1995 ESA) of the production of illegal, marketed activities. However, definitional decisions concerning 
the production boundary have often been challenged. Feminist scholars have long noted that the 
goods/services distinction in home production ensures activities mainly performed by women are not 
measured, to the detriment of social policy decision-making (Waring 1988, Folbre & Nelson 2000). 
The value of leisure as a component of economic welfare is not reflected in GDP either, although there 
have been attempts to capture this. Nordhaus and Tobin’s well-known ‘Measure of Economic Welfare’ 
estimated the value of leisure to be the same order of magnitude as conventionally measured GDP, 
when valued at market wage rates to reflect the opportunity cost (Nordhaus and Tobin 1972). A more 
recent economic welfare measure indicates that whereas the United States has large advantage over 
other rich OECD economies in terms of real GDP per capita, incorporating leisure (as well as mortality 
and inequality) into a welfare-enhanced GDP measure almost closes the international gap, indicating 
the importance of choices on these margins for economic welfare comparisons (Jones & Klenow 2016).  
 
 
Why there is a household satellite account 
 
These longstanding concerns about omissions from GDP have been addressed by the development of 
satellite accounts. Satellite accounts measure areas of activity at least in part excluded from the ‘core’ 
                                            
5 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna2008.asp 
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SNA because they are outside the production boundary. Eurostat first put forward methodological 
proposals for a household satellite account (HHSA) covering own-account production and consumption 
in 1999, and the ONS followed up with detailed methodological proposals and its first experimental 
estimates in 2002 (Holloway et al 2002).6 One source of data for the HHSA is a time use survey, which 
is combined with appropriate methods for valuing the time households spend on each kind of activity.7 
Table 1 illustrates time use patterns but unfortunately time use surveys are not conducted regularly, and 
there are issues of quality and comparability over time in the results. ONS also implements an output 
approach in the HHSA as recent time use surveys are unavailable, aiming to measure directly the 
services provided rather than measuring the labour input to produce them. In order to value home 
produced services, when by definition no market price is available, the alternatives are to use: market 
wage rates to apply to time use data; the opportunity cost of the labour time involved; or the price of a 
near-market alternative (Abraham and Mackie 2005, Chapter 3). 
 
Table 1: Time use patterns – an illustration 
 All Employed 30-49 
hours/week 
Caring for 
family/homemaker 
Minutes per day    
Employment 176 305 8 
Commuting 21 37 1 
Job search 0 0 0 
School/study 15 5 4 
Volunteering 11 8 15 
Eating & personal 134 119 133 
Childcare 20 17 95 
Housework/shopping 173 128 286 
Socialising/entertain 63 58 62 
Exercise/sport 14 14 10 
Hobbies & games 21 18 14 
Mass media 184 150 169 
Sleep 508 499 526 
Other 100 83 117 
Total 1440 1440 1440 
Extracted from Table1, Labour Market Trends, February 2004, based on 2000 time use survey 
 
ONS published a second full UK HHSA in 2016, using both time use data and a range of survey and 
administrative data to estimate output.8 The HHSA covers the value of adult and childcare, household 
housing services, nutrition, clothing and laundry, transport (any privately provided non-leisure 
transport such as commuting, shopping, school run), and volunteering.9 The activities included were 
selected according to the ‘third party criterion’, in other words whether a third party could provide 
these services in the market (Reid 1934). This excludes therefore self-care and leisure. Table 2 sets out 
                                            
6 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-statistical-working-papers/-/KS-CC-03-003 for more on 
Eurostat’s approach. 
7 ONS carried out UK time use surveys in 2000/01 and 2014/15. Most recent UK data are available from Gershuny 
et al (2017), UK Data Service. In the US the Bureau of Labor Statistics conducts time use surveys on an ongoing 
basis, https://www.bls.gov/tus/.  
8 The 2016 ONS HHSA (in absence of up-to-date time use data) was estimated using the output approach, using a 
range of survey or admin data sources to create estimates based on units of service produced x price per unit. 
When time use data is used then the input approach can be used: hours worked x market wage rate (plus any 
adjustments for market equitv tax/subsidies and gross operating surplus). 
9 https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/householdsatelliteaccounts2011to2014  
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the relationship between the SNA ‘core’ and the household satellite, with the lightly shaded boxes 
lying inside the production boundary and therefore included in GDP. Nominal values for the UK in 
2014 are also given in the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Relation of household satellite account to core National Accounts 
‘Core’ SNA Household satellite account 
SNA production  
(£1817.3bn) 
Non-SNA production 
(£1018.9bn) 
Market 
production 
Voluntary 
production 
(goods)  
Household production for own use Voluntary 
production 
(services) 
(£23.3bn) 
Own 
account 
production 
of goods 
(£0.2bn) 
Housing 
services 
produced by 
owner-
occupiers 
(£177bn) 
Services 
produced for own 
use: 
childcare 
(£320.6bn) 
adult care 
(£56.9bn) 
housing services 
(£149.7bn) 
nutrition 
(£144.3bn) 
clothing/laundry 
(£5.6bn) 
transport 
(£235.8bn) 
  
A B C D E F 
Source: Table from Eurostat 2003; figures are for 2014, from ONS 2016a. Note that ‘housing services 
produced by owner occupiers’ refers to imputed rent for living in the property; ‘housing services’ in the 
non-SNA category refers to DIY delivery of building maintenance. 
 
Substitution has always occurred between activities included in GDP and excluded from it. Since the 
1950s there has been growing substitution from own-use production of services such as nutrition and 
childcare to purchases of such services in the market, as the proportion of women engaged in paid 
employment has risen. For example, as 40% of lone-parents of under-fives work and 62% of couples 
with under-fives are both employed, use of marketed childcare is clearly extensive. Households’ 
recorded annual expenditure on ‘nursery, crèche, playschools & childcare payments’ was £4.7bn in 
2014, while public expenditure on child care (including tax credits) was £5.2bn. In the latest HHSA 
estimates, the gross value added of all childcare services in the home was £320.6bn, and output of 
childcare services in the home for children under five was £132bn (32.5bn hours x £4.06 per hour in 
the 2014 HHSA estimates). The value of own-account childcare services is thus greater than the 
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imputed rental for living in owner-occupied housing.10 The logic of substitutability – albeit a choice 
made before production rather than after in the case of services – could argue for some of these other 
categories of home production being placed on the GDP side, or alternatively for removing the imputed 
rental of owner occupied dwellings from GDP and putting it with other home-produced services in the 
HHSA.  
 
 
Digital home production  
 
Here, however, I focus on new kinds of household production involving digitally-enabled activities. In 
2017, 90% of adults in the UK had home internet access and 80% go online daily (up from 57% and 
35% respectively in 2006). The average time spent online in March 2017 was 83 hours during the 
month. Among the 50 million estimated online users in the UK, 69% said they engaged in online 
shopping, 63% online banking (and a third said they did this at least once a month), 30% uploading or 
creating online content. 11 These figures have been increasing steadily since ONS and Ofcom started 
their surveys; these are not minor activities but a significant part of the lives of the majority of UK 
consumers.  
 
The Bean Review noted that there has been an increase in households performing for themselves online 
services previously purchased in physical stores, such as booking holidays or undertaking banking 
transactions; there is still a supplier of a marketed service (although the identity of the intermediary 
may have changed from a traditional high street agent to an online platform). Some elements of the 
service (such as search and assembly of holiday packages) are performed by the individual using a 
domestic asset (a home computer or device) and inputs (an internet connection). Participation in the 
‘sharing economy’ may also be increasing production activities by households for sale in the market, 
involving the use of household assets such as dwellings and cars as well as labour. Thirdly, many 
individuals are contributing voluntary digital labour to provide digital services/products in effect as 
public goods, which households and businesses may be substituting for purchased alternatives; 
examples include coding open source software, and creating user-generated content. I consider these 
three in turn below. 
 
Becker’s (1965) model of time allocation, bringing together the household production and the market 
consumption and production decisions, helps frame the discussion. Households combine time and 
market goods to produce basic commodities Zi  
                                            
10 Family Spending, Table A1 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/incomeandwealth/compen
dium/familyspending/2014-12-02/familyspending2014referencetables; 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201415/ldselect/ldaffchild/117/11706.htm 
11 ONS Internet Access Survey 2017 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/householdcharacteristics/homeinternetandsocialmediausa
ge/bulletins/internetaccesshouseholdsandindividuals/2017 Ofcom technology tracker, 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/105438/uk-internet-online.pdf 
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 Zi = fi (xi, Ti)        (1) 
 
where the xi is a vector of market goods (including capital services of durable goods) and Ti is a vector 
of time inputs (such as weekday hours, weekend hours, nighttime hours) used in producing market 
commodities, and the partial derivatives of Zi with respect to both inputs are non-negative. Rewriting 
the production functions, 
 
 Ti = tiZi         (2) 
 Xi = biZi 
 
The ti and bi are vectors giving the time and market goods inputs per unit of Zi. Households combine 
the inputs via these household production functions to maximise utility  
 
U = U (Z1, …. Zm)        (3) 
 
in the usual way, subject to budget constraint where Z is the bound on resources Zi, and g the 
expenditure function 
 
 g (Z1, … Zm) = Z        (4) 
 
The expenditure function includes expenditure on both market goods and time; these are not 
independent because time can be converted into more market goods by spending more time at work 
and less in consumption. There is therefore a single constraint 
 
Spixi.  + STiw´ = V + T𝑤"        (5) 
 
where the pi are the prices of the market goods, and 𝑤"	is a vector of wages paid for hours of work in the 
different categories, and V is other income. Substituting in the production functions, (5) can be written 
as  
 
 S (pibi.  + Ti𝑤") Zi = V + T𝑤"       (6) 
 
Or in other words the full price of the goods consists of the sum of the prices of the market goods (pi) 
and time of different types (Ti) used in production of the market goods. Behind these components of 
price lies an allocation of time to market work and consumption.  Becker’s barbershop example is just 
one among many. Many service activities have undergone various technological and business model 
changes over time, and these can move activities across the production boundary. Given the wide scope 
of the adoption and use of digital technologies in many service activities, it is evident that such shifts 
are occurring now.  
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Household production of digital intermediation services 
Turning to the first category of services where there is a production boundary effect due to digital, the 
activities in question include what might be labelled do-it-yourself digital intermediation services. 
These involve the substitution of online activity at home for some components of purchased services. 
Table 3 gives examples.  
 
Table 3 Examples of household digital intermediation services 
Banking 63% of UK adults used internet banking in 2016 
Financial trading No estimate of numbers for normal personal 
transactions eg via ‘wrapper’ platforms; many 
‘day trading’ services advertised and careers 
advice available: https://www.reed.co.uk/career-
advice/how-to-become-a-day-trader/ 
Insurance broking Many households search online for insurance 
Mortgage broking Many households search online for mortgages 
Travel advice & reservations 46% used the web for travel or accommodation 
services 
Estate agency Many households search online for properties; 
there are some online-only estate agencies 
Employment agency 25% used the web to look for a job or send a job 
application 
Online search Almost everyone who is online – 90% of UK 
households 
Percentage figures are from ONS Internet Access Survey 
 
The growth of the new ‘do-it-yourself’ digital intermediation services has certainly not wholly 
displaced market intermediation; indeed intermediary businesses such as banks and estate agencies see 
the web as another channel partly replacing their conventional high street engagement with consumers. 
There has been a change in the identity of the market intermediaries in some of these examples, with 
new online (sometimes overseas) intermediaries taking market share; but there are still market 
transactions taking place. Yet to some extent households themselves are carrying out some of the 
functions of the previous high street intermediaries, such as search in travel and estate agency, or 
transactions such as making payments and setting up standing orders in online banking.12 They also use 
their own domestic capital (computers, tablets or smartphones) as well as the capital (IT systems) of the 
intermediaries. To the extent that this is the case, it will have reduced measured revenues, output and 
employment in the affected sectors, and hence GDP, all else being equal (although of course household 
expenditure will have been reallocated away from travel agents to other items, including a portion of 
their broadband subscription payments). 
 
Households do though have access to a wider choice and save some time compared with their pre-
digital options, although just as with other own-production of services they contribute some of their 
own labour time to the activities. In addition, households are engaged in new kinds of online activities 
                                            
12 It might be objected that search is not a productive activity, so the digital intermediation in this respect has 
simply reduced a transaction cost. To the extent this is true, it was also not part of the marketed service provided 
by travel agencies etc., and their marketed activities are those replaced by household production. 
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for which there were previously no (or only a few) market intermediaries. An example is online search 
not previously possible such as looking for films or restaurants before going out, or locating suppliers 
(‘personal concierge activities’?). This could be a large effect; Varian (2016) has estimated that the 
value to consumers in the US of time saved through use of online search rather than going to a library 
or other alternatives is approximately $65 bn annually.13 One could argue the internet has also made 
positive changes to the range and quality of the services the consumer can access, but at a fraction of 
the cost. While in theory this should be reflected in the national accounts, if the price deflator has been 
sufficiently adjusted to take account of the falling cost of a matched service, in practice this is not the 
case. 
 
It is impossible to know from currently available statistics how much personal labour time is involved 
in supplying these own-account services. This seems an obvious information gap to be addressed by 
future time use surveys. It will almost certainly be less time than was involved in going to the high 
street and queueing. These activities would fall into the same category as other own-use services such 
as laundry, childcare etc (column E in Table 1). Their growth will probably have involved a switch 
away from marketed intermediation services, although many market providers will remain, offering a 
changing array of services through different business models (such as personal financial advice rather 
than straightforward counter transactions in banking).  
 
Some idea of scale can be gleaned from looking at banking. As Figures 1 and 2 show, there has been a 
34% decline in the number of physical bank branches since 2003, and an increase from 30% to 63% in 
the proportion of people using online banking services between 2007 and 2017. This seems to indicate 
a quantitatively meaningful switch in activity across the production boundary in about a decade. 
Although disaggregated data for productivity growth are not available, the UK’s finance sector has 
seen a decline of about 18% in its level of productivity since 2008 (EUKLEMS 2017). 
 
Figure 1: Number of physical bank branches in the UK  
                                            
13http://cdn.oreillystatic.com/en/assets/1/event/57/The%20Economic%20Impact%20of%20Google%20Presentatio
n.pdf 
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Source: French et al 2013; https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-banks-branches/british-banks-set-to-
close-record-762-branches-this-year-idUKKCN1B31AY 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of UK adults engaging in online banking 
 
 
Source ONS 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/householdcharacteristics/homeinternetandsoci
almediausage/datasets/internetaccesshouseholdsandindividualsreferencetables 
 
 
The ‘sharing’ economy 
A second set of household activities involving home produced but (sometimes) marketed activities is 
the ‘sharing economy’ (for which there is no firm definition, but covers peer-to-peer matching 
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platforms).14 In Table 1 these conceptually sit in the final column (F) if non-marketed, while their value 
added (of the digital platform and the suppliers to the platform) sits in the first column (A) if sold in the 
market. 15  Compared with the conventional businesses providing similar services (such as 
accommodation or taxi rides), the technology creates an intensive margin between home production 
and work in the market, as distinct from the extensive margin between home work and having a job. 
 
Digital intermediation also increases the efficiency of matching, which is a clear increase in economic 
welfare to the extent that preferences and products are heterogeneous. There is also in principle an 
increase in the efficiency with which household capital assets are used – so for example, cars can stand 
idle less of the time, and fewer may be owned, releasing land currently used for parking. In addition, 
prices on sharing platforms are often lower than the prices of market equivalents. In the conventional 
national accounts framework, welfare increases not reflected in market prices are not captured in GDP, 
while the dynamics of improved capital efficiency are complicated and anyway currently small in scale.  
 
ONS work to date has identified three categories of these market sharing economy activities, 
distinguished by output characteristics, set out in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: 'Sharing Economy' categories 
Property rental and access Airbnb, LoveHomeSwap, JustPark 
Peer-to-peer services Etsy, TaskRabbit, Lyft, Bookalokal 
Collaborative finance Zopa, Veridu, Funding Circle 
 
These also have different input mixes, with the first category involving more intensive use of 
household capital, the second more use of labour, and the third financial capital. There are in addition 
sharing activities that do not involve any financial transactions (such as Freecycle, Olio, or 
neighbourhood time banks), which will substitute for some marketed activities. 
 
A big challenge is simply the collection of data on these activities. In the UK, the ONS has started 
collecting additional data, while new online data collection techniques may help in future.16 To 
measure peer-to-peer activities, the fee or commission revenues of the platforms (businesses such as 
Taskrabbit and Airbnb), the earnings of individual participants (drivers, hosts etc), and prices paid by 
users are all required. Another practical challenge is the extent to which these activities involve 
purchases of intermediate goods, which ought in principle to be netted out, and also use the services of 
household capital assets, of relevance when it comes to looking at productivity measurement. Just as 
business purchases of intermediate goods need ultimately to be netted off final revenues in the GDP 
figures, so with production for the market by households; and this is in fact done in some of the HHSA 
                                            
14 This nomenclature is controversial because it extends a term originally applied to non-marketed peer-to-peer 
activities such as time banking and Freecycle to monetary activities. The distinction between marketed and free is 
certainly key. 
15 Income on owner-occupied housing would also be set against the imputed rent component of GDP. 
16https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/economicoutputandproductivity/output/articles/thefeasibilityofmeasuringthesh
aringeconomy/progressupdate 
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categories. Extending this is a tall order: how for example could one begin to measure purchases of 
household cleaning products for use in cleaning a room rented out on Airbnb rather than for domestic 
use? However, there are new supply chain services emerging in the largest segments of the ‘sharing 
economy’, such as intermediaries that will look after cleaning and key transfer for properties. It will be 
more straightforward to collect this data.  
 
When it comes to assets, at present owner occupied housing is the only household asset to feature in 
national account statistics, in the form of the imputed rental paid for the capital service. While housing 
is the largest asset by value owned by the household sector, many sharing economy activities involve 
the use of cars, computers, sewing machines, perhaps even 3D printers or domestic robots in future. All 
of these are productive durable assets providing a stream of services. Some authors have long argued 
for including these services in their growth accounting calculations (for example, Jorgenson 2009). As 
long as such peer-to-peer activities within the household sector remain small scale, the omission of 
capital services from household assets may not be significant. If they were to grow, this would be an 
issue for estimates of multifactor productivity.  
 
The sharing economy has been growing rapidly. ONS figures suggest many people use such platforms 
– 28% and 22% of UK adults used accommodation platforms and ride sharing platforms respectively in 
201717   – but the extent to which they use them is not known. Reflecting the technological possibility 
of greater flexibility in time allocation, ‘contingent’ employment patterns in general are becoming 
more widespread: although there is no definitive way of measuring it, relevant indicators such as self-
employment, zero hours contracts, and industry figures point to significant expansion in the past 
decade (Coyle 2017a).  
 
Furthermore, the prices charged by sharing platforms have not to date been included in the sampling 
for consumer price indices, and even if they were now to be included through the usual matching 
process or as a new good, the resulting index would omit a substantial part of the price reduction 
available (Groshen et al, 2017). It is clear that prices on accommodation platforms, for instance, can be 
considerably lower than hotel room process. For example, Figure 3 compares the average daily rate 
received by Airbnb hosts and the average daily rate for hotel rooms in London in late 2014 to mid-2016 
(Coyle & Yeung, 2017). While not identical products, the price gap is substantial. 
 
Figure 3: Average daily rate received, Airbnb room, single hotel room 
                                            
17 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/householdcharacteristics/homeinternetandsocialmediausa
ge/datasets/internetaccesshouseholdsandindividualsreferencetables 
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Source: Airbnb data provided by Airdna; hotel data provided by STR. 
 
Voluntary digital production 
The third category of household production where digital is starting to have a big impact is in the 
voluntary provision of digital outputs. There is category of free digital services or products provided by 
individuals, although to some extent individuals may seek to monetise these activities, for example by 
signing up to receive advertising revenue from videos uploaded to YouTube, or increasing future 
earnings through raising their status in online fora.18 Table 5 gives examples. 
 
Table 5 Examples of unpaid digital provision 
Type Examples Marketed 
substitutes 
Scale? 
Open source 
software 
R, Python, 
Apache, Linux, 
Mozilla ….  
Proprietary 
software eg 
Windows, Stata, 
IOS 
Linux largest installed base of 
general operating systems; About 
50% of web servers globally run 
Apache. For growth in use of R 
see 
http://r4stats.com/articles/popularit
y/  
Online software/tech 
advice 
Stack Overflow, 
SourceForge, 
GitHub, … 
Consultancy, 
software services 
“With the tools we provide, 
developers on SourceForge create 
powerful software in over 430,000 
projects; we host over 3.7 million 
registered users. Our popular 
directory connects more than 41.8 
million customers with all of these 
open source projects and serves 
more than 4,800,000 downloads a 
                                            
18 There is no resolution to the long debate about whether advertising should be treated as intermediate or final 
consumption. See Kaldor (1940); Harrison (1999); also Nakamura and Soloveichik (2015) for a discussion of ad-
funded digital media more generally.  
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day” 
Writing/editing 
online material 
Wikipedia; blogs Purchased reference 
works, books, 
magazines etc 
Millions of volunteer producers 
Uploading videos, 
other entertainment 
YouTube; social 
media 
Purchased 
entertainment  
300 hours uploaded to YouTube 
every minute; 3.25 billion hours 
watched globally per month. 
Average 6 hours/week spent on 
Facebook. 
Other advice, 
discussion forums 
MumsNet, health 
advice forums 
Subscriptions to 
clubs 
 
Educational material Khan Academy, 
CORE 
Economics, 
lecture videos and 
podcasts 
Textbooks, tutors Khan Academy used by 2m 
teachers and 40m students 
monthly. Number of free 
educational downloads from 
iTunes U passed 1bn in 2013. 
Crowdsourced 
information, user-
generated content 
Waze, congestion 
& travel 
information 
Local radio; or not 
previously available 
 
User/open innovation 
& design 
 Did not previously 
occur – serves 
initially small 
markets, may be 
commercialised as 
the markets grow 
Von Hippel’s (2017) surveys 
suggest quantity is extensive. 
Some likely to remain non-
commercialised as potential 
markets are small. 
 
 
As with household production for own-use, the time spent on these activities and its valuation could be 
accounted for, although there are important caveats. For example, the distinction between leisure and 
productive activity for use by others is not at all clear in some of these examples. Some of the 
reallocation of time will be from leisure (rather than paid work) to home production. The valuation of 
time spent on digital production would probably be higher than the valuation of time spent on leisure 
alternatives if using a market substitute approach; but valuation is particularly tricky because many of 
these zero priced products are public goods (non-rival in consumption) and also durable (able to be 
consumed over long periods) although intangible. 
 
There is also perhaps a question as to whether household provision of these unpaid digital activities to 
other parties should be considered as household provision of voluntary services (F), or as household 
provision of goods with close market substitutes (D); and it may differ by category. Typical voluntary 
services have included examples such as working in a local charity shop, volunteering in schools, or 
acting as a trustee or governor. In the recent HHSA, their estimated value was relatively small.  
 
What is the right way to treat these unpaid digital outputs? Some economists have argued that they are 
an economically efficient mode of production of goods and services in contexts where information 
asymmetries and transaction costs inhibit either market or managerial organisation of production, but 
individuals have sufficient motivation to produce for ‘the commons’ (Lerner & Tirole 2005, Benkler 
2002). The interaction of the household commons with market activities in the national accounts is 
more complicated than the straight substitution of own-use provision for marketed alternatives. What’s 
more, the scale of these activities could be large, but it is difficult to assign them to a national territory. 
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However, they are often close substitutes for marketed digital and non-digital products classed as goods 
(packaged software, encyclopaedias, books and magazines, DVDs). They could be marketed after 
production, just like other products that straddle the production boundary. 
 
There are no readily available statistics on either personal or business use of these various digital 
products provided for free, and to construct estimates would involve a very challenging data collection 
and valuation programme. However, the scale seems likely to be large. Greenstein and Nagle (2014) 
estimate that the use of just one product, Apache, in the US equates in value to between 1.3% and 8.7% 
of the stock of private investment in pre-packaged software. There is ample anecdotal evidence of for 
instance the rapidly growing use of open source software, including by large companies such as 
Walmart and Netflix.19 The cost savings businesses can make by switching to open source software are 
significant.20 Tallying downloads of the different forms of free software and estimating the impact on 
proprietary alternatives is nigh on impossible, but some suggestive evidence is provided by Robert 
Muenchen (2017). He presents figures on the number of articles listed on Google Scholar on the top six 
proprietary packages. These and other indicators (such as job listings and some downloads data) point 
to possible substitution from market to free (Figure 4). 
 
Even if some definitive raw statistics were available, the problem of assignment within the national 
accounts and satellite accounts would be made more complex by the fact that household contributions 
merge inextricably with foundations and non-profits. For instance, two New Zealand university 
lecturers originally developed the R software, although other individuals were responsible for much of 
the subsequent development, while Apache was created by a group of friends who later formed their 
joint enterprise into a non-profit foundation.  
 
Figure 4: Top six proprietary software packages  
 
                                            
19 https://www.linux.com/news/enterprise-open-source-programs-flourish-tech-and-elsewhere 
20 http://www.computerweekly.com/news/450401822/Open-source-no-longer-scares-the-enterprise 
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Source: Muenchen (2017), number of articles on Google Scholar, from http://r4stats.com/articles/popularity/ 
 
 
The scale of substitution across the production boundary 
 
These classification issues are not straightforward. Bean (2016, p95-96) writes: “Maintaining a clear 
distinction as to whether an entity is acting as a consumer or a producer is important for the accurate 
classification of economic activity.” However, the possibility of making a clear distinction is 
diminishing due to the digitally-enabled changes; the same entity – us – is more easily able to act in 
both capacities and on an intensive as well as extensive margin. There is, in the examples discussed 
here, considerable substitution between an existing marketed (digital or non-digital) product and home 
digital production thanks to the reallocation of time incentivised by digital technologies, just as Becker 
(1965) discussed. It is obviously the case that if households are undertaking more activities online, they 
are doing less of something else (Wallsten 2015). However, there is some evidence that the incremental 
welfare gains and hence incentives to substitute are large, for example in the evidence that households’ 
willingness to pay for broadband connections and digital goods is high (Roston et al 2010, Byrne and 
Corrado 2017). The scale question, the extent to which such products are substituting for marketed 
versions, is highly relevant to assessing the productivity puzzle. So too is the issue of new goods prices 
for the deflators used to calculate real GDP, a question I do not pursue here. 
 
The absence of data oover time n home production means it is not possible to estimate the scale of 
digital substitution; we have for the UK, for instance, the 2000 point estimate that on average 197 
minutes a day are spent in paid work/commuting and 358 minutes a day in household work. Some 
earlier work using simple calibrated growth models suggests that including a home production sector 
and the possibility of time reallocation can make a significant contribution to the evolution of output, 
including over the business cycle; Benhabib et al (1991) include home production to account better for 
puzzles in the cyclical behaviour of US output and productivity. Parente and Wright (2000) find that 
including a home production sector means relatively small percentage distortions to (market) capital 
accumulation can, depending on other parameter values, account for large differences between output 
levels in different countries. Greenwood et al (2005) consider the scope of substitution from home to 
market production due to innovation in domestic technologies, and estimate that about half the increase 
in women’s labour force participation in the US during the 20th century was due to technological 
progress such as electricity in the home and domestic appliances.  
 
These authors assume standard CES and constant returns functional forms. Individual preferences are 
given by:  
 $  𝛽&  [ln 𝑐& + α ln (1- 𝑛&)])&*+  
where  
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𝑐& = [𝜇𝑐/&	0 + (1 − 𝜇)𝑐6&0 	] 8/0 
 
is a mix of market consumption cmt and non-market consumption cnt while nt is the sum of time spent in 
market and home work, nt = nmt + nnt.  
 
There are home and market production functions: 
 𝑐6&		 = 	 𝑘6&; 		[	(1 + 𝛾	)&		𝑛6& ] 8=; 
  𝑦&		 = 	 𝑘/&? 		[	(1 + 	𝛾)&		𝑛/&]1-θ 
 
We also require: 𝑦& = 	 𝑐/& +	𝑥/&	 +	𝑥6& 
 
Given the exogenous rate of technological change ϒ, there is a balanced growth path with nmt and nnt 
constant and market output, market consumption and home consumption as well as the capital stocks kj 
growing at the same rate. The law of motion for the capital stock, for j=m,n, is: 𝑘A,&C8	 = D1 −	𝛿AF𝑘A& + 𝑥A&	 
 
It is intuitive in this very simple growth model that a shift into home production will be more likely to 
occur the larger is 𝜖 (substitutability between home and market consumption), and the smaller is 𝜙, (the 
share of household capital stock). The thought experiment here is what happens to market output 𝑦& 
due to a shift to non-market activity? In the absence of data on non-market time and non-market 
consumption the model is not identified without strong assumptions about specific functional forms 
and parameter values (Gronau, 2006). A further consideration is that over the period post-2007, when 
technology use has shifted so much, the aftermath of the financial crisis will certainly have affected 
output too. However, an illustration of the potential in theory for quite substantial variation in market 
output can be gained from varying the elasticity parameter 𝜖, holding everything else constant. Other 
parameters can be set to standard values (β = 0.98, γ = 0.02, δn,m = 0.06, 𝜃 = 0.33). If consumer 
durables excluding houses are taken as the home production capital stock, 𝜙  = 0.10 might be 
reasonable. Micro data estimates suggest 𝜖 could be 0.4-0.45 for the US in the pre-digital era (Rupert, 
Rogerson and Wright 1995, McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright 1997). Table 6 below is simply 
illustrative of the potential market output relative to the 2000-2007 UK average21 as a result of varying 
this elasticity. This should not be taken as a numerical claim about what has actually happened. 
However, the model makes the intuition clear: with all due caveats, the effect on measured market 
output of substitution from market into home production could potentially be significant. This is 
consistent with other calibrated models which find that the introduction of home production can help 
explain otherwise puzzling phenomena such as the scale of increased leisure time in the face of income 
                                            
21 https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/grossdomesticproductgdp/datasets/ukquarterlynationalaccountsdatatables 
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tax differences between countries (Duernecker and Herrendorf, 2018) or inter-country differences in 
productivity larger than obvious tax distortions would lead one to expect (Parente at al, 2000). 
 
Table 6 Market output as 𝜖	varies 𝜖 𝑦&  
relative to 
baseline 
0.45 90 
0.5 83 
0.55 77 
0.6 72 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
 
Practical data issues  
 
The discussion here highlights several practical issues for statistical collection. 
 
a) Time use data 
One key data collection requirement to incorporate the output component described above will be the 
collection of additional household data in the time use survey to understand the labour inputs used to 
produce these digital intangible goods and services. Any further valuation of household non-market 
activity involves conceptually the imputed flow of utilised human capital. An extended time use survey 
will need to distinguish between time spent on online activities for household own-consumption, for 
leisure, and for ‘voluntary’ production of digital products. These would need careful piloting to ensure 
respondents’ answers map onto the economic categories. A significant extension of time use surveys 
would surely require IT-enabled data collection. There is some other existing survey material on 
people’s online activity. For example Ofcom conducted a large-scale one-off survey in 2016 for its 
‘Digital Day’ research.22 However, this is focussed on consumption of entertainment and does not 
include the categories needed for economic analysis. It could also be of interest to capture different 
activities by demographic categories. Time use data, which is collected based on diaries, would also 
potentially be able to contribute to measuring the labour supply component of the types of digital 
activity considered so far – digital DIY intermediation, the sharing economy, and the production of 
open source digital products. Other potential needs for additional data collection concern the sharing 
economy (where as noted the ONS already has some work planned). In addition to including new 
intermediaries in this sector in survey samples, it could be useful to check that the collection of data on 
incomes and expenditures also includes the sharing economy.   
 
                                            
22 http://www.digitaldayresearch.co.uk/media/1083/digital-day-2016-chart-deck-adults-aged-16plusin-the-uk.pdf 
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b) Valuing digital home production  
If household digital production were to be placed inside the production boundary, like household 
production of goods, the market value of the use of these digital products would need to be estimated. 
As all have near-market substitutes, one approach would be to apply, for example, the price of a similar 
proprietary software package to an open source product, and to an estimated quantity of downloads of 
the software, although there might of course be immense practical difficulties, not least geo-locating 
the input activity and the uses or downloads (Nordhaus 2006, Greenstein and Nagel 2015). 
 
c) Intermediate production 
The national accounts are based on a value added approach, whereby the value of intermediate goods 
used in the production process is deducted from the value of a product or service, in order to avoid 
double counting.23 Byrne and Corrado (2017) provide estimates for the US of capitalised consumer IT 
durables, and find significant growth in real services from consumer digital assets. 
 
d) Household capital assets 
The use of capital equipment affects household productivity. This is just as true of non-digital 
household services for own use: someone providing home laundry services is more productive with a 
washing machine than a mangle. The productivity gain is realised in the form of time saved to engage 
in other activities, as well as a possible quantity and quality improvement. Digital household services 
need online access to be possible at all, so households have to purchase computers and install 
broadband at home. Currently the only household capital asset accounted for in the national accounts is 
owner occupied housing, because of the imputation included in GDP, and because domestic dwelling 
investment is captured in GDP(E). One justification for this is that a home is by far the most valuable 
asset households ever own. However, the second major asset owned by many households is the car. 
With a growing proportion of households leasing a vehicle (including through car clubs), and so the 
scale of the potential switch from ownership to rental or vice versa increasing, a case could be made for 
including imputed rentals for car owners. 
 
e) Quality improvements  
The substitution from marketed to household account intermediation activities may also involve 
changes in quality or other characteristics such as wider choice and discovery of variety. Quality 
change in the case of marketed goods in principle can be captured using hedonic techniques, but in this 
case that would be harder because there is no price for the replacement (household) intermediation 
service; although a shadow price for this activity could in principle be hedonically adjusted over time. 
As with marketed goods, it may be the case that the changes in characteristics are sufficiently large or 
different in character that they should be considered an increase in consumer surplus due to innovation 
rather than a quality change in an existing good/service.  
 
                                            
23 An aggregate measure that does not deduct intermediate goods is Gross Output, now regularly published for the 
US by the BEA. See Skousen (1990). 
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f) Cross-border activity 
Digital activities cross national borders with little friction, yet borders define the collection of statistics, 
and frame the way productivity is analysed. Many of the types of digital activity considered here are 
global in their production and consumption. It is not obvious how the contribution of volunteer digital 
production in the UK alone (say to open source software) can be measured, on the production side, nor 
how easily the consumption of these digital products in the UK can be measured on the expenditure 
side. In the case of intermediation services, the transition to digital has led to the substitution of a 
domestic, bricks and mortar business by an overseas-based online business, which might anyway be 
using intellectual property or other intangible intra-company transfers to locate its valued added in 
another country.  
 
Discussion and extensions 
 
I argue, in contrast to some other recent research, that measurement issues due to digital technologies 
may be making a contribution to the observed marked slowdown in productivity growth since around 
2008. This paper has considered the adoption and use of digital technologies by households and 
businesses involving behaviours that lead to substitutions out of GDP across the production boundary 
into home production. Digital technology has enabled and incentivised a reallocation of time from 
market to household. This is not a new phenomenon: safety razors did the same for shaving, while 
washing machines spurred a substitution of activity in the other direction. However, the potential scale 
of the current shift in time allocation is quite large, and taking account of time costs therefore may help 
our understanding of slower measured productivity growth of some market sectors of the economy. 
Although it is impossible without additional data collection to know the scale of these substitutions, the 
pieces of available evidence, from the use of free software or Wikipedia usage to the extent of 
contingent forms of employment, suggest it is large and growing. 
 
This paper has focused on substitutions across the production boundary. The issues arising from the 
need to select a boundary have been little debated in economics since the early days of the formation of 
the present System of National Accounts. However, as Simon Kuznets (1947) pointed out in his 
pioneering work, the selection of what is inside and outside the production boundary is vital for any 
assessment of long-term growth trends:  
 
“Of the quantitatively impressive growth of total output in this country, as measured in the 
ordinary estimates of national income, a large part is to be associated with the extension of the 
business at the expense of the family sector. Consequently, one important prerequisite for a 
more efficient measurement of economic growth lies in the inclusion of such sectors of 
production that easily escape the statistical eye. As specific examples we may cite the capital 
formation involved in the work of American farmers in bringing virgin land into cultivation, 
or the work within the old- fashioned large family, so much of which has been taken over in 
recent decades by business firms.” 
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In other words, he argues that some part of the impressive productivity growth recorded in the mid-20th 
century was a measurement artefact due to substitution out of household production into the market, 
thanks to improvements in domestic technologies. Substitutions are currently occurring in the opposite 
direction, thanks to digital technologies, and may correspondingly help account for part of the 
lacklustre real growth performance. Compared to a counterfactual world of no digital activity in home 
production, substituting for market production, measured productivity will be lower in sectors 
substituted away from (as in Becker’s barbershop example); but productivity measured across both 
market and household at ‘time plus money’ prices would be higher. To gain a better understanding of 
scale will require substantial further data collection, and statistical agencies are just starting to grapple 
with the needs of measuring the digital economy. 
 
Some researchers have argued that a clear distinction must be made between increases in economic 
welfare due to innovation (in goods and services or business models) and increases in marketed 
activities, and that the main effect of digital technologies is simply to increase consumer surplus. For 
example, in concluding that, “From a conceptual perspective, GDP does not look to be deficient, 
Ahmad & Schreyer (2016) put weight on the fact that, “Measures of the total value of consumer 
welfare such as consumer surplus are at odds with the conceptual basis of measuring GDP.” By 
definition, on this view, zero priced activities should not be taken account of in measuring GDP in 
nominal or volume terms. Those who advocate this conventional SNA approach do not deny that 
digital change is important, but their preferred approach would be to extend the household satellite 
account.  
 
Valuable as it would be, this approach has drawbacks. Although national accountants often describe 
GDP as simply monetised production, and not an economic welfare measure, this becomes a fiction as 
soon as it is deflated. The use of any price index is an attempt to create a measure that holds utility 
constant over time (with well-known challenges about how to achieve this). Real GDP is therefore 
inherently a welfare concept. As noted above, currently the GDP deflator will be failing to incorporate 
low and zero prices and so will understate real GDP. To the extent that the deflators are constructed 
using hedonic methods, adjusting for quality change, the welfare dimension is all the more prominent, 
for it is not possible to draw a clear boundary between quality changes and consumer surplus (NBER, 
1961, cited in Stapleford, 2009, p316). Further research is clearly needed on the implications of digital 
innovation for price indices. 
 
Others have argued the need for adding welfare enhancements of different kinds to the ‘headline’ GDP 
figures (Jones and Klenow, 2016; Jorgenson, 2017). If real terms GDP is useful at all, then perhaps a 
wider measure of economic welfare would be more useful still, including welfare changes arising from 
the highly visible changes taking place in the economy at present. This is a big debate, also beyond the 
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scope of this paper. It is hardly a new one either, and is well reflected in the ‘GDP and Beyond’ 
agenda.24 
 
However, the speed and scope of digital transformation has certainly reopened the question of what our 
conventional statistics can tell us. To reinterpret Robert Solow’s famous (1987) comment, it is a 
paradox that digital is visible everywhere except the productivity figures; big changes that every 
individual in the OECD economies is experiencing in everyday life do not show up in what everyone 
takes to be the main indicator of economic progress.  
 
 
  
                                            
24 For an introduction, see http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/gdp-and-beyond 
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